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COMMENTS 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS-CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 3 OF 
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT-In Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation 
846 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
Co.1 plaintiff sought to recover treble damages and asked injunctive 
relief, claiming defendant had sold filled milk at unreasonably low 
prices for the purpose of destroying competition by plaintiff in its 
sale of a like product in violation of section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act.2 In affirming an order dismissing the complaint, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a private action 
may not be maintained for a violation of section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act. That very same week, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in Vance v. Safeway 
Stores.3 In that case the trustee in bankruptcy of an operator of a 
retail grocery brought an action against the defendant supermarket 
for treble damages and equitable relief for allegedly violating sec-
tion 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act in selling certain items at un-
reasonably low prices with knowledge and intent to destroy com-
petitors. In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit held 
that section 3 is an amendment to the Clayton Act4 for which a 
private action for treble damages5 and injunctive relief6 is available. 
This conflict in the courts of appeals is a culmination of the 
· confusion that has surrounded section 3 since it was first drafted.7 
Referred to as a "grotesque manifestation of the scissors and paste 
pot method of drafting a potentially drastic criminal statute,"8 it 
was originally drafted as the Borah-Van Nuys9 bill and intended to 
be an alternative to the longer and more explicit Robinson-Patman 
legislation.10 As a compromise, the Borah-Van Nuys bill was "past-
ed" onto the Robinson-Patman Act as section 3.11 It was generally 
believed that section 3 was a separate penal statute, not technically 
l (7th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 86. See also Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., (7th Cir. 
1956) 237 F. (2d) 869, filed simultaneously. 
2 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §13a. 
s (10th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 144. See also Dean Oil Co. v. American Oil Co., (D. C. 
N.J. 1956) 1957 Trade Cases if68,593; Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, (10th Cir. 1957) 1957 
Trade Cases 1[68,635. 
4 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §12. 
5 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §15. 
6 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §26. 
7 On the origin and impact of the Robinson-Patman Act generally, see citations in 
Rowe, "Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-
Patman Act," 66 YALE L. J. I at 2, n. 5 (1956). 
s Oppenheim, "Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?" CCH ROBINSON 
PATMAN ACT SYMPOSIUM 141, 153 (1948). 
9 S. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936). See 80 CoNG. REc. 6346 to 6348 (1936). 
10 80 CONG. REc. 6331, 6332 (1936); H. R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936). 
For legislative history see ZORN AND FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAws (1937); 
WERNE, BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN LAw, A SYMPOSIUM 99 to 132 (1938). "A 
Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act," 49 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 196 at 285 (1954). 
11 80 CONG. REc. 6346 (1936). Senator Patman opposed this amendment to his bill. 80 
CoNG. REc. 8227, 8228 (1936). 
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part of the "antitrust laws" as defined in the Clayton Act, 12 for 
which no private suit for treble damages could be maintained.13 
Therefore, enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act was believed 
to be (1) by cease and desist orders of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion; (2) by the Department of Justice through civil proceedings 
for injunctions under section 1, and by criminal proceedings under 
section 3, and (3) by private parties for injunctions or treble dam-
ages under section 1, but not under section 3. The Department of 
Justice has been reluctant to enforce this "potentially drastic crim-
inal statute," and no prosecution has produced a conviction under 
section 3.14 By contrast, the civil suits under this section have 
become quite numerous.15 
I. Development of the Conflict 
A federal district court of Texas was the first to disallow treble 
damages under section 3, although the court did allow a single 
damage action.16 In 1947, though the point was not directly ar-
gued in the case, Supreme Court dicta seemed to indicate approval 
of a treble damage action under section 3 in Bruce's Juices v. 
American Can Company.17 After this decision the number of cases 
allowing civil section 3 actions increased.18 
The earlier cases were not clear on the point. The private right 
to sue under section 3 was not clearly in issue, since it was used in 
combination with other antitrust laws as a basis for suit. In 1950, 
12 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §12. 
13 See material cited in Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., (7th Cir. 1956) 238 F. 
(2d) 86 at 90; Vance v. Safeway Stores, (D.C. N.M. 1956) 137 F. Supp. 841 at 847. 
14 United States v. American Petroleum Institute, Civ. No. 8524, (D.C. D.C. 1949) and 
United States v. Borden Co., No. 48, Cr. 362, (N.D. Ill. 1949) 89 F. Supp. II2, both volun-
tarily dismissed by the United States; United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., (N.D. Ill. 1949) 
89 F. Supp. ll2, revd. on other grounds (7th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 159, revd. and remanded 
341 U.S. 214 (1951), dismissed on a procedural point; United States v. Maryland & Vir-
ginia Milk Producers, Inc., (D.C. D.C. 1956) 145 F. Supp. 374, dismissal of indictment by 
the United States, 1956 CCH Trade Cases 1(66,263. 
15 On private enforcement, see Loevinger, "Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act 
by Private Parties," address before the Section on Antitrust Law of the New York State 
Bar Association, January 24, 1957 (unpublished); Clark, "The Treble Damage Bonanza: 
New Doctrines of Damages in Antitrust Suits," 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 363 (1954); Doyle, "Treble 
Damages and Counsel Fees," A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw PROCEEDINGS 142 (1954); 
61 YALE L. J. 1010 (1952). . 
16 Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, (E.D. Tex. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 39 at 43. 
17 330 U.S. 743 at 750 (1947). See also dicta in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 
U.S. ll5 at II7 (1954). 
18 A. J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 
890; Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Coal Storage Co., (5th Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 453; Gor-
don, Wolf, Cowen Co. v. Independent Halvah & Candies, Inc., (S.D. N.Y. 1949) 9 F.R.D. 
700; Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., (D.C. Conn. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 408; Moore v. Mead Service Co., 
(10th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 338. 
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however, the question was squarely presented in Balien Ice Cream 
Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,19 and the district court held that a civil 
treble damage suit was proper. Doubt was cast on this holding by 
dicta in National Used Car Market Report, Inc. v. National Auto-
mobile Dealers Association,2° in which the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia indicated that it was inclined to the view 
that no civil action for treble damages or injunctive relief could 
be maintained under section 3. Weight was added to this position 
by the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to 
Study the Antitrust Laws, which felt that " ... acceptance of Sec-
tion 3 as a basis for private treble damage litigation involves highly 
dubious statutory construction and, more important, finds support 
neither in the legislative intent nor overall antitrust policy."21 The 
district court in the Vance case, impressed with the logic of the 
Attorney General's Report, held that the Balien Ice Cream case 
was decided wrongly, and that a private treble damage action could 
not be maintained under section 3.22 The present cases move the 
conflict into the circuit courts of appeals-the Seventh Circuit fol-
lowed the reasoning of the district court in the Vance case, and the 
Tenth Circuit overruled the district court's holding in Vance, and 
followed the reasoning of Balien Ice Cream. 
II. Conflict in the Court of Appeals 
Agreeing that the United States Code is only prima facie evi-
dence of the laws, 23 both courts looked to the act itself to determine 
whether section 3 is an "antitrust law" as defined by the Clayton 
Act, entitling a private party to maintain a civil action for treble 
damages. Both courts sought legislative intent and applied rules 
of statutory construction to arrive at diametrically opposed conclu-
sions. Each court started with the common thesis that if section 3 
is an amendment to the Clayton Act (as section 1 is admitted to 
be), it is an an~itrust law for which the Clayton Act allows treble 
19 (S.D. Cal. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 796 at 802. See also F. &: A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden 
Farms, (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180; Hershel California Fruit Products Co. v. Hunt 
Foods, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 1954) 119 F. Supp. 603; Myers v. Shell Oil Co., (S.D. Cal. 1951) 96 
F. Supp. 670. 
20 (D.C. D.C. 1951) 108 F. Supp. 692, affd. (D.C. Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 359. See also 
note 46 infra. 
21 P. 201. 
22Vance v. Safeway Stores, (D.C. N. M. 1956) 137 F. Supp. 841 at 847. 
23 Vance v. Safeway Stores, (10th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 144 at 145; Nashville Milk Co. 
v. Carnation Co., (7th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 86 at 89. 
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damages24 and suits for private injunctions,25 since the Clayton Act 
is therein stated to be such an antitrust law,26 and an amendment 
takes on the status of the statute which it amends. 
The court of appeals in Carnation felt that the legislative his-
tory pointed to an intent that section 3 was not an amendment to 
the Clayton Act27 and that this view was substantiated in the statu-
tory construction of the Robinson-Patman Act. The court pointed 
out that, whereas the first section of the Robinson-Patman Act be-
gins with the statement " ... Section 2 of [the Clayton Act] is 
amended to read as follows ... ,"28 no such statement appears at 
the beginning of sections 2, 3 or 4 of the act. Therefore, reasoned 
the court, these sections "do not purport to amend as Section I 
specifically did."29 Following this enacting clause, the entire sec-
tion I is enclosed in quotation marks, whereas the remaining sec-
tions are not. This was again evidence to the Seventh Circuit that 
only section I was meant to amend the Clayton Act.30 
The Tenth Circuit in the Vance case cited legislative history in 
support of its theory of congressional intent,31 and was completely 
unimpressed with the argument concerning statutory construction 
made in the district court, which was followed by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in the Nash ville Milk case. The title and enacting clause 
expressly declares that the act is an amendment to the Clayton Act, 
and since there is only one enacting clause, the court felt that every-
thing following is meant to be an amendment to the Clayton Act, 
disagreeing with the significance the Seventh Circuit attributed to 
the placing of the quotation marks.32 
Additional arguments favoring the Tenth Circuit's conclusions 
might be made. Although indicative, titles of statutes and legis-
lative history are not conclusive, and only an examination of each 
statute, as to its objects, purposes and subject matter, can reveal 
their true relation.33 The purpose of the antitrust laws is to "sup-
press combinations to restrain competition and attempts to mo-
24 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §15. 
25 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §26. 
26 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §12. 
27 Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., (7th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 86 at 89, 90. 
28 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §13. 
29 Nashville Mill< Co. v. Carnation Co., (7th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 86 at 89. 
so Ibid. 
Sl Vance v. Safeway Stores, (10th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 144 at 146. 
S2Ibid. 
ss Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., (S.D. Cal. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 796 at 799. 
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nopolize by individuals and corporations. "34 Therefore, it can be 
argued, the entire Robinson-Patman Act is an amendment to the 
Clayton Act since their objects or purposes and situations to which 
the laws apply are similar.36 A further argument might be that 
since the definition of "antitrust laws" in the Clayton Act is in 
terms of "including," Congress did not intend to "exclude" from 
that definition statutes with antitrust purposes other than those 
specifically named which might be enacted in the future.36 
III. Possible Resolution of the Conflict by the Supreme Court 
The outcome of this contradiction at the circuit courts of ap-
peals level remains to be resolved by action of the Supreme Court.37 
If the Court should follow the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, section 3 
will probably return to a "limbo of unenforced criminal laws."38 
If the Court should follow the Tenth Circuit's view, however, as 
its own dicta indicate that it might,39 a further question will be 
raised-that of the constitutionality of section 3. 
A. Constitutionality of Section Three 
Although dealing with the same subject matter, the Borah-Van 
Nuys bill differs from section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act40 in 
several significant particulars, some of which cast doubt on its con-
stitutionality. Section 3 forbids any person, on pain of fine or im-
prisonment, (1) "to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of 
sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge 
against competitors of the purchaser, in that any discount, rebate, 
34 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 at 351 (1943); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms 
Co., (S.D. Cal. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 796 at 801. 
35 Vance v. Safeway Stores, (10th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 144 at 146; Spencer v. Sun Oil 
Co., (D.C. Conn. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 408 at 410; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal 
Trade Commission, (3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 667 at 676 to 678; Balian Ice Cream Co. 
v. Arden Farms Co., (S.D. Cal. 1950) 94 F. Supp 796 at 801. 
See also Oliver Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, (4th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 
763 at 767; Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (4th Cir. 1945) 150 
F. (2d) 607 at 609. 
36 If this reasoning is sound, it would appear to apply equally to §5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45, which declares unfair trade practices in 
interstate commerce to be unlawful but makes no mention as to a private right to sue 
for treble damages or injunctive relief, but it has been held that no such action for treble 
damages may be maintained for a violation of that section. Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 
(E.D. Tex. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 39. 
37 Certiorari has been granted. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co. (No. 699), and 
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance (No. 707), 25 U.S. LAw WEEK 3253 (1957). 
38VAN CISE & DUNN, How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 12 (1954:). 
39 Note 17 supra. 
40 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §13. 
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allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser 
over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising 
service charge available at the time of such transaction to said com-
petitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and 
quantity;" (2) "to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the 
United States at prices lower than those exacted [elsewhere] for the 
purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor;" 
or (3) "to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices 
for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a com-
petitor." 
Clause 1. In contrast to section 1, clause I of section 3 appar-
ently allows unlimited quantity discounts. This clause does not 
prohibit different prices or quantity discounts, rebates, or allow-
ances, so long as the same allowances are granted competing pur-
chasers of like quantity of the same grade or quality. For a section 
1 offense there must be two sales involving price discrimination, 
whereas the language of section 3 appears to indicate that a single 
contract to make a sale can be a violation, although it has been held 
otherwise.41 Clause I further differs from section I in that only dis-
criminations affecting the competitors of the buyer are unlawful. 
Doubt as to the constitutionality of clause I results from the 
omission of a requirement that such discrimination must have an 
adverse effect on competition,42 requiring only that discrimination 
be "to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser." This 
might be the most potent clause in section 3 since it prohibits dis-
crimination in the most sweeping terms without providing for any 
of the exceptions and safeguards of section 1, except discounts based 
on grade, quality or quantity.43 While it may be conceded that 
Congress can regulate prices in private industry,44 such a drastic 
provision might be open to the charge that the law violates due 
process in that it is "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious," and 
that the "means selected ... [has no] real and substantial relation 
to the object sought to be attained."45 
41 Klein v. Lionel Corp., 1956 CCH Trade Cas. 1[68,485 (3d Cir. 1956). The court read 
§2 (a) and §3 together, concluding that "competitors" means "competing purchasers from 
the same seller." But, it is submitted a different result would follow from the wording of 
§3 that such discount, etc., merely need be "available at the time of such transaction •••• " 
See A. J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 890. 
42 Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. General Foods Corp., (F.T.C. 1954) 3 CCH TRADE 
REG. REP., 10th ed., 1]25,069, discussed in 55 CoL. L. REv. 106 (1955). 
43 WERNE, BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN LAW, A SYMPOSIUM 60 (1938). 
44 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). See note 71 infra. 
45 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 525 (1934). 
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The constitutional question might be avoided, however, by 
reading into clause 1 the general purposes and limitations of sec-
tion 1 through a liberal judicial construction of "knowledge."46 
Th11s, if the Court construes this clause to require competitive in-
jury, it would probably be upheld, since a similar provision of the 
original section 2 of the Clayton Act has been generally assumed 
to be constitutional.47 Read literally, clause 1 makes no express 
provision for the meeting of competition or other defenses explic-
itly provided under section I. Some legislative history48 indicates 
that Congress intended such defenses to apply to section 3, and it 
is logical that if they applied under the civil section, they should, 
a fortiori, apply under the criminal section. The Court might also 
maintain that the word "discriminates" means not mere difference 
in price, but a difference where the circumstances create a duty to 
treat all parties alike.49 The Supreme Court has read in an analo-
gous "rule of reason" in interpreting the phrase "in restraint of 
'trade" in section 1 of the Sherman Act.50 This could result in giv-
ing section 3 discriminations the same meaning and scope as those 
prohibited in section 1. 
Clause 2. Clause 2 is aimed at territorial price cutting with in-
tent to destroy competition or eliminate a competitor, such as that 
in Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.51 
This clause adds nothing new to the law. Such predatory price 
slashing has always been a civil violation of the Clayton Act, and 
when it constitutes an attempt to monopolize, it would also be a 
crime under section 2 of the Sherman Act52 and an unfair method 
of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.53 
603. 
46 Hershel California Fruit Products v. Hunt Foods, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 1954) 119 F. Supp. 
47 George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929). 
48 80 CONG. R.Ec. 9903 (1936). 
49 Cf. 80 CONG. R.Ec. 9416 (1936), in which a frequently quoted definition of "discrimina-
tion" as used in the Robinson-Patman Act is given by Congressman Utterback, manager of 
the Conference Bill, stating, "In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more 
than a mere difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relation-
ship exists between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treat• 
ment, whereby the difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon the 
other." But see AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN• 
SON-PATMAN Acr, rev. ed., 18 (1953). 
50 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 at 60 (1911). See RE· 
PORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITIEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, 5 to 
12, and cf. 201 (1955). 
51 (2d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 234. See also Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
52 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §2. 
53 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45. 
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Clause 3. Clause 3 requires for a violation, (1) a sale or con-
tract to sell at "unreasonably low prices" (2) "for the purpose of 
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." This third 
clause evokes the greatest doubts as to its constitutionality. No dis-
crimination is required, and no standard for determining "un-
reasonably low prices" is supplied. Because this is a penal statute, 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires that it be so definite and certain that it 
clearly apprises of the condemned conduct.54 Failing this, it may 
be invalid for vagueness as a civil statute as well.55 What then are 
"unreasonably low" prices? Does this mean below cost to the seller? 
Below cost to the injured competitor? Below the average price 
charged by the industry? What account should be taken of differ-
ences in volume, margins, seasonal fluctuations, overcapacity and 
oversupply? Should a businessman be required to disclose his 
profits upon every charge of selling at an "unreasonably low" price? 
The very problem of determining costs and profits of isolated trans-
actions is often impossible.56 Because of this indefiniteness some 
courts have seriously questioned the constitutionality of this 
clause.57 Doubt was also expressed in the Report of the Attorney 
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws.58 
A similar provision in the Lever Act59 was declared unconstitu-
54 F. & A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms, (S.D. Cal. 19!H) 98 F. Supp. 180 at 184; 
Conally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 at 391 (1926); International Harvester Co. 
of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 at 222 to 224 (1914); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 
at 230 to 246 (1951); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 at 517, 518 (1948). 
55 A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 at 239, 240 (1925); 
Standard Chemicals & Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chemical Corp., 231 N.Y. 51 at 54, 131 N.E. 
566 (1921). 
56 Myers v. Shell Oil Co., (S.D. Cal. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 670. But see F. & A. Ice Cream 
Co. v. Arden Farms, (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180 at 189, discussed in 100 UNIV. PA. 
L. REv. 1058 at 1061 (1952). Courts have relied on numerous factors to determine "rea-
sonableness." See Hershel California Fruit Products v. Hunt Foods, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 1954) 
119 F. Supp. 603 (seasonal factors, good faith, cost, perishability); Gordon, Wolf, Cowen Co. 
v. Independant Halvah and Candies, Inc., (S.D. N.Y. 1949) 9 F.R.D. 700 (cost and profit 
data); F. & A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms, (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180 (costs, mar• 
ket conditions, level of profits); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., (S.D. Cal. 1950) 
94 F. Supp. 796 (meeting competition); Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, (10th Cir. 1957) 1957 
CCH Trade Cas. 1!68,635 (market conditions). Cf. state statutes prohibiting sales below cost. 
See Lovell, "Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing under State Law," 57 
YALE L.J. 391 (1948), and materials cited in OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, CA.sEs, 
COMMENTS AND MATERIALS, 947, n. l (1950). 
57 Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (8th 
Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 419 at 422; United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., (N.D. m. 1949) 89 
F. Supp. 112. Cf. Hershel California Fruit Products Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 
1953) 111 F. Supp. 732. 
58P. 201. 
59 41 Stat. 297 (1919), 21 U.S.C. (1952) §2. 
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tional as being too uncertain.60 The Supreme Court there held 
that a criminal law is lacking in due process when so vague that 
men of ordinary intelligence must guess as to its meaning or appli-
cation. "Unreasonably low" might be sustained if the Court should 
view the phrase as having a technical or special meaning, or if there 
is a sufficient common law background of precedents to act as a 
guide in construction.61 The test laid down in F. &- A. Ice Cream 
Co. v. Arden Farms62 is that of the "reasonably prudent man." 
But it is submitted that such a standard should not apply here, 
since society has not dictated standards of what a "reasonable" 
price should be.63 Judge Yankwich in F. &- A. Ice Cream grounded 
validity of this clause in the argument that sufficient definiteness 
is supplied by the additional requirement that such "unreasonably 
low prices" must be coupled with the "purpose of destroying com-
petition or eliminating a competitor."64 
An additional problem is posed in determining "purpose." Is 
the seller to be held to an objective test measured by the necessary 
and foreseeable consequences of his actions? It has been so held.65 
In F. &- A. Ice Cream~ the court indicated that the same factors 
which might be considered in determining "reasonableness" of 
prices would form the basis of deciding the fact question of 
whether the "unreasonably low" price was fixed for the "purpose" 
of destroying competition or a competitor.66 Such an interpretation 
would tend to eliminate any distinction between the two require-
ments, resulting, through application of the objective approach, in 
a finding of scienter wherever the price should be found "unreas-
60 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). See also Cline v. Frink 
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). 
61 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). "The vagueness of the Sherman Law 
was saved by imparting to it the gloss of history." Federal Trade Commission v. Motion 
Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 at 405. (1953). But see note 63 infra. 
62 (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180, noted in 100 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1058 (1952). See 
also Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (8th Cir. 
1942) 131 F. (2d) 419; Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., (N.D. Ill. 1951) 1950-51 CCH Trade 
Cas. 1!62,859. 
63 See note 60 supra. See also: Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921); In-
ternational Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914). "Doubts besetting 
Section 3's constitutionality seem well founded; no gloss imparted by history or adjudica-
tion has settled the vague contours of this harsh criminal law." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 201 (1955). Cf. note 61 
supra. 
64 (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180 at 187. See also: Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 
266 U.S. 497 at 501 (1925); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 at 348 (1918); Nash v. 
United States, 229 U.S. 373 at 377 (1913). 
<l5 United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 at 541, 543 (1913); F. & A. Ice Cream Co. v. 
Arden Farms, (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180 at 189, 190. 
66 F. & A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms, (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180 at 189, 190. 
1957] COMMENTS 855 
onably low." If the separate requirement of "purpose," is thus 
read out, the sole criterion left is the definiteness and certainty of 
the phrase "unreasonably low" prices. 
Certainly this result is not desirable. Since the necessary result 
of every sale is to injure a competitor, in a criminal statute there 
should be required a finding of subjective intent to destroy com-
petition or eliminate a competitor. Such an intent should include 
"malice" in the criminal sense. It should be shown that the defen-
dant's intent was to drive out a competitor, and not merely to get 
business.67 If the requirement of scienter could be thus separated 
from the determination of "reasonableness," the additional require-
ment of purpose to destroy competition would tend to "relieve the 
statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense 
of which the accused was unaware."68 
Because Congress has practically unlimited power to exclude 
from interstate commerce,69 it has a similarly broad power of regu-
lation.70 Here, therefore, "the norms by which it is determined 
whether due process has been violated are entirely different."71 
But the norms of due process should not be stretched to the point 
of imposing criminal liability for an offense of which the defendant 
was unaware. In absence of requiring such actual "malice" the 
clause must be judged on the certainty and definiteness of its stand-
ard of reasonableness. None of the cases cited in F. b A. Ice Cream 
as indicating the validity of a standard of reasonableness is in 
point.72 
While it may be true that "the test of reasonableness or un-
reasonableness or similar tests which can be judged by reference 
to a common standard of conduct satisfy the requirement of defi-
niteness,"73 it is submitted that in the great diversity of business 
practices there is no such objective "common standard of conduct." 
Punishment of a child by a teacher,74 "featherbedding,"75 claiming 
income tax deductions,76 driving an automobile,77 making con-
67 See WERNE, BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN I.Aw, A SYMl'OSWM 62 (1930). 
68 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 at 102 (1945). 
69 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I at 36, 37 
(1937); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 558-559 (1944). 
70 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 at 48 (1939); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 
408 at 423, 424 (1946); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 at 19 (1946). 
71F. & A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms, (S.D. Cal. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 180 at 183. 
72 Id. at 185, 190. 
73Ibid. 
74 People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. 771, 300 P. 801 (1931). 
75 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). 
76 United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942). 
77 Miller v. State of Oregon, 273 U.S. 657 (1927). 
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tracts tending to fix prices,78 and obstructing navigation79 are all 
situations in which an actor can justifiably be held to a "standard 
of reasonableness." In each of these the actor can rightly be put on 
guard to act "reasonably" or suffer the consequences. Efforts to get 
business by lower prices, however, is an accepted method of com-
petition. To subject a businessman to criminal liabilities for an 
error of judgment in setting his prices "unreasonably low" is not 
only unjust, but also inconsistent with the basic purpose of our 
antitrust laws-the promotion of competition. 
Conclusion 
The fate of this ineptly drawn statute remains for the Supreme 
Court to determine. It is always difficult to discover what was in 
the collective mind of Congress, but reference to legislative history 
at least casts serious doubt on whether section 3 was meant to allow 
civil treble damage actions. The wording of the statute adds to this 
doubt. Moreover, the very validity of section 3 has been seriously 
questioned. Its pervasive prohibitions against all "discriminations" 
in price against competing buyers without requiring an adverse 
effect on competition and with no justifications or defenses other 
than that the goods must be of like grade, quality, or quantity, and 
its vague and indefinite prohibition against selling at "unreason-
ably low" prices whether or not discriminatory, cast grave doubts 
on its constitutionality. However, the Supreme Court, through 
liberal judicial construction, might read section 1 defenses into 
clause 1 and uphold clause 3 of section 3 under the broad com-
merce power of Congress as requiring a reasonably prudent man 
test, coupled with a requirement of scienter. 
This is a criminal statute, and treble damages are punitive-
ordinarily provided only to punish willful and conscious violations 
of the law.80 It is submitted that to apply such penalties to section 
3 of the Robinson-Patman Act-which appears to frustrate compre-
hension by lawyers and judges, and more so by laymen- is unjust 
78 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State of Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909). 
79 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907). 
so There is a conflict of opinion among writers as to whether treble damages should be 
allowed in any civil suit where the violation was not willful. For arguments against treble 
damages where violation is not willful see Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: 
Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1209 (1952); 
REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 
379 (1955); Chadwell, "Antitrust Administration and Enforcement," (Symposium on the 
Attorney General's Report) 53 MICH. L. REV. 1133 at 1150 (1955); Segal and Mullinix, 
"Administration and Enforcement," (Symposium on the REPORT) 104 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 
285 at 306 (1955); Cummings, "A General Survey and Critique," (Symposium on the 
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and lacks due process. Supreme Court dicta and the weight of 
lower court authority, however, tend to indicate that section 3 will 
not likely be invalidated on this basis. If this be true, the only real 
solution to this dilemma would be for Congress to clarify the law 
by a restatement more in conformity with accepted business prac-
tice and basic antitrust policies. 
Richard E. Day, S.Ed. 
REPORT), 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 305 at 308 (1955). For arguments in favor of civil treble 
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